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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellant Philip Hudson owns littoral property on Priest Lake. The boundary between
Hudson's property and the adjacent submerged lands of the State is determined by the location of
the Ordinary High Water Mark (OHWM) of Priest Lake at Statehood. In order to protect his
property from erosive action, Hudson placed fill on his property, by hand, over a period of several
years. That fill extends approximately nineteen (19) feet waterward of the elevation of the OHWM
as urged by the State. Hudson accomplished this work without a permit and under the belief that he
was working on his own property.
IDL brought an enforcement action against Hudson under the Lake Protection Act (LPA).
IDL claimed that Hudson had placed fill waterward of the OHWM without a permit. IDL took the
position, by sworn submissions, that the OHWM of Priest Lake was located at elevation 243 7.64 feet
and that Priest Lake did not have an Artificial High Water Mark (AHWM). Hudson claimed that
there were material issues of fact as to the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake. Hudson claimed
that the OHWM of Priest Lake was at least two vertical feet lower than the level urged by the State.
If Hudson is correct, then Hudson's unpermitted encroachment lies upland of the State-owned bed,

is part and parcel of Hudson's property, and is not otherwise subject to the provisions of the LPA.
IDL moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that Hudson had violated
provisions of the LPA and for entry of injunctive relief ordering the removal of the fill. The District

Court entered partial summary judgment in favor ofIDL (certified as final pursuant to IRCP 54(b)),
including corresponding injunctive relief. The District Court concluded that IDL had jurisdiction
up to elevation 2437.64 feet (which would include the land lying under the Hudson encroachments)
based upon the concept of an AHWM. Hudson argues that the District Court's decision on partial
summary judgment was in error as the State has affirmatively represented, under oath, that there is
no AHWM on Priest Lake and that the sole issue for determination is whether or not the OHWM of
Priest Lake is 2437.64 feet or lower. Hudson suggests that material issues of fact as to the location
of the OHWM of Priest Lake precluded entry of summary judgment and that the District Court's
decision should be reversed.

B.

Course of Proceedings.

On July 13, 2015, the State ofldaho, the Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners, and the
Idaho Department of Lands (collectively referred to herein as "IDL"), brought suit against Philip
Hudson (hereafter "Hudson"). R., pp. 7-14. IDL's complaint was filed under the provisions of the
Idaho Lake Protection Act, LC. §58-1301, et seq. (hereafter "the LPA'') and LC. §58-312. IDL
alleged that Hudson, an owner of littoral property on Priest Lake, had placed an unpermitted and
unauthorized encroachment (fill comprised of concrete, rocks, and dirt) below the ordinary high
water mark ("OHWM") of Priest Lake. Id.
IDL's complaint asserted two claims. First, IDL claimed that Hudson had violated the LPA
by placing fill waterward of the OHWM of Priest Lake, and that a mandatory injunction should enter
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ordering Hudson to remove such fill as may be located below the OHWM. Id. at pp. 5-7. Second,
IDL asserted a trespass claim under LC. §58-312, and requested similar injunctive relief ordering
Hudson to remove any fill located waterward of Priest Lake's OHWM. Id. at pp. 6-8. Hudson
answered ID L's complaint, and asserted a counterclaim. Id. at pp. 15-24. Hudson alleged that the
fill in issue was located upland of the OHWM of Priest Lake. Id. at pp. 21-22 (,r7). Hudson asserted
two counterclaims. First, Hudson asserted a counterclaim for declaratory relief adjudging and
decreeing that the encroachments on the Hudson parcel are located upland of the OHWM of Priest
Lake as it existed on July 3, 1890. Id. at p. 22 (,rl 0). Second, Hudson asserted a claim for quiet title
to the property upon which the fill was located (alleged to be upland of the OHWM of Priest Lake).
Id. at pp. 22-23.
IDL thereafter moved for partial summary judgment on its first claim for relief under the
LPA. Id. at pp. 68-70. In support ofits motion, IDL affirmatively alleged that the OHWM of Priest
Lake at statehood was 2437.64 feet MSL. Id. 1 In support ofits motion, IDL affirmatively "denie[d]
that there is an artificial high water mark of Priest Lake .... " Id. at p. 70. IDL argued that the Hudson
encroachment was located waterward of elevation 2437.64, that said elevation represented the
OHWM of Priest Lake, and that an injunction should enter ordering Hudson to remove the fill. Id.
at pp. 68-70.

All elevations used herein are consistent with those used in proceedings before the
District Court. Those elevations are consistent with the method and manner by which IDL
administers the LP A at Priest Lake and are based upon datum of 1929 (supplementary adjustment
in 1947). R., p. 84.
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IDL supported its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the affidavits of Mick
Schanilec and Matthew Anders. Shanilec is Area Manager for the Priest Lake Supervisory Area
IDL. Id. at p. 84. Schanilec testified by affidavit, under oath, that "the State considers the natural
or ordinary high water mark" of Priest Lake to be 2437.64. Id. at p. 84. Anders is a hydrologist
employed with the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR"). Id. at p. 110. Anders did not
offer an opinion as to the elevation of the O HWM of Priest Lake at statehood.
Hudson's materials in opposition to IDL's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment included
declarations of Hudson, Ernest M. Warner, PLS, and Drew C. Dittman, P.E. Hudson averred, inter
alia, as follows:
I did not seek a permit for the work [which I] accomplished by hand ... , as I
believed, and continue to believe, that I was working on my own property, and
placing no encroachments in or on the water or the property of the State ofldaho.
Id. atp. 168.
Warner, a licensed surveyor with 43 years of experience who previously offered expert
testimony in Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208, 970 P.2d 1 (1998) and In Re: Sanders Beach, 143
Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006), offered several opinions. In particular, Warner opined:
(I)

That the OHWM of Priest Lake, at Statehood, was at least two vertical feet
lower than 2437.64, and perhaps as much as 2.3 vertical feet lower.

(2)

That most, if not all, of the Hudson fill was located upland of the OHWM as
located pursuant to his opinion (2 to 2.3 vertical feet lower than 243 7.64
feet).

(3)

That the Hudson property would extend 19 feet waterward of elevation
4

2437.64 feet if Warner's opinion as to the true location of the OHWM (at
least 2435.64 feet) was correct.
Id. at p. 202.

In his declaration, Dittman averred that he physically measured the Hudson fill and that it
extended 19 feet wateward of elevation 2437.64. Id. at p. 217. In other words, if the OHWM was
located two vertical feet lower than 2437.64, consistent with Warner's opinion, than Hudson's
encroachments would be located upland of the OHWM.
On June 15, 2016, IDL, by way of reply, submitted the Second Affidavit of Mick Schanilec.
Id. at p. 231. The second Schanilec affidavit was submitted five (5) days prior to the June 22, 2016
hearing which IDL had noticed on its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id. Obviously, the
second Schanilec affidavit was not filed in compliance with the timelines set forth in IRCP 56.
Further, the second Schanilec affidavit was not accompanied by a motion to alter the timelines under
IRCP 56(e).
On June 17, 2016, Hudson moved to strike the second Schanilec affidavit. Id. atpp. 251-252.
The Motion to Strike was accompanied by a Motion to Shorten Time. Id. at pp. 267-69. Following
the June 22, 2016 hearing on IDL's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court issued its
"Memorandum Decision and Order," granting IDL's motion. Id. at pp. 307-14. The District Court
held that "because [Idaho Code §58-1302] makes clear that the State of Idaho has the power to
regulate and control encroachments on land lying between the OHWM and the AHWM [Artificial
High Water Mark]," that IDL was entitled to the requested relief. Id. at p. 312. Hudson claims that
5

the District Court's order, and the judgment that followed it, are in error based upon the disputed
facts presented on summary judgment. IDL specifically denied, as a matter of fact, that there was
an AHWM on Priest Lake.
On July 15, 2016, the Court entered a "Mandatory and Permanent Injunction," ordering that
Hudson remove all unauthorized fill "below the high water mark of Priest Lake, regardless of
whether the high water mark is natural or artificial.. .. " Id. at p. 316. The parties subsequently
stipulated to entry of a judgment certified as final in accordance with IRCP 54(b). Id. at pp. 318-20.
On July 28, 2016, the District Court entered its "Amended Partial Judgment," certified as final
pursuant to IRCP 54(b), which was consistent with the terms of the Court's "Mandatory and
Permanent Injunction" of July 15, 2016. Id. at pp. 328-30. On August 12, 2016, Hudson timely
appealed from the District Court's Amended Partial Judgment, Memorandum Decision and Order,
and Permanent Injunction.

C.

Statement of Facts.

The State ofldaho owns in trust for the public title to the beds of navigable waters below the
Ordinary High Water Mark (OHWM) as it existed at the time Idaho was admitted into the Union
(July 3, 1890). See,~' Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208,970 P.2d 1 (1998). The OHWM is "the
line which the water impresse[d] on the soil by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the soil
of its vegetation and destroy its value for agricultural purposes," as of July 3, 1890. Erickson v.
State, 132 Idaho at210-l 1 (citing Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, 99 Idaho 793,796,589 P.2d 540
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(1979) and I.C. §58-104(9)).
A dam was constructed by the State ofldaho, at the outlet of Priest Lake, in approximately
1950. R., p. 112. The dam was first used for water storage purposes on August 9, 1950. Id. Since
1951, the approximate date when the dam became operational, the level of Priest Lake has been
stabilized from the months of July through September at elevation 2437.64 feet. R., p. 198.
In proceedings before the District Court, IDL affirmatively represented that "it denies that
there is an artificial high water mark of Priest Lake .... " R., p. 70. Mick Schanilec, Area Manager
for the Priest Lake Supervisory Area for IDL, offered sworn testimony that "the State considers the
natural ordinary high water mark of Priest Lake to be 2437.64 feet." R., p. 84.
The Hudson fill extends approximately 19 feet waterward of elevation 2437.64. R., p. 217.

If the OHWM of Priest Lake, at Statehood, was approximately two vertical feet lower than 24 3 7. 64
feet (the OHWM level urged by IDL), then most, if not all, of the Hudson fill would be located
upland of said OHWM. R., p. 202.
Hudson offered evidence on summary judgment, including the expert opinion of Ernest
Warner, suggesting that the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake at statehood was at least two
vertical feet lower than the elevation urged by IDL (2437.64 feet). This evidence included expert
hydro graph interpretation and historic survey information. 2

A "hydrograph" is a tool used by hydrologists to study the characteristics of a
waterway and includes elevation readings measured over a given period of time and plotted in
graphic format. R., p. 112.
2
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Hydrograph evidence of Priest Lake levels predating 1950 show that the lake elevation
annually fell to 2435.64 feet by approximately August 1 of each year (or two (2) vertical feet lower
than the OHWM as urged by IDL). R., pp. 198 and 205. Prior to 1950, the level of Priest Lake fell
to approximately 2435.l feet by September 1 (or 2.54 feet lower than the OHWM urged by IDL).

The location of a given OHWM, at Statehood, is a question of fact. The OHWM can be
determined, in part, based upon the utilization of a vegetation test. 3 It is self-evident that vegetation
grows in North Idaho during the month of August. It can reasonably be inferred from the evidence
that prior to 1950, the elevation of Priest Lake was at least two (2) vertical feet lower than the level
urged by IDL. Further, since the adjacent upland soil was free of the presence of water above
elevation 2435.64 feet during the month of August, it is more probable than not that under a
vegetation-based test, the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake at Statehood was at least two (2)
vertical feet lower than the level urged by IDL.
Other independent evidence, offered on summary judgment by Hudson, included the location
of the original GLO meanderline adjacent to the Hudson property.
"Meanderlines" established by government survey are survey lines drawn
along the banks of navigable streams for the purposes of defining the sinuosities of
the banks of the stream, and as the means of ascertaining the price to be paid by the

A given OHWM is determined in part by "the line which the water impresse[d] on
the soil by covering for sufficient periods of time to deprive the soil of its vegetation and destroy its
value for agricultural purposes." See In Re: Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho at 446 (citing LC. §58104(9)).
3
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purchaser to the government for meandered fractional lots.
Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, 99 Idaho 793, 796 (citation omitted), 589 P.2d 540 (1979).
Ordinarily, meanderlines established by surveys of public lands bordering on navigable lakes are not
boundary lines. Id. Rather, the boundary line is the OHWM, regardless of the location of the
meanderline. Id. In general, meanderlines are established by a Government Land Office (GLO)
survey. R., pp. 198-99. Although not a boundary line, the location of a meanderline can have
independent historical significance based upon the instructions given to the GLO surveyor for
purposes of locating the meanderline. Id. at p. 199.
The Hudson property is located in Section 3, Township 61 North, Range 4 West, Boise
Meridian. Id. The Hudson property was initially surveyed for the GLO on September 7, 1900 by
Robert Bonser. Id. The Manual of Surveying Instructions in effect at the time of the Bonser survey
would have been the 1894 version of the Manual of Surveying. Id.
The 1894 Manual of Surveying directed the surveyor to locate the meanderline consistent
with the then-existing Ordinary High Water Mark which, in Idaho, coincides with the vegetation line.
Id. at pp. 199-200. Thus, the existing vegetation line, at the time of the survey, ten years after
statehood, was supposed to form the basis for locating the sinuosity of the shore. Id.
Accordingly, while the physical location of the meanderline is not in and ofitself a boundary,
the location of a given meanderline on an inland navigable lake has independent historical
significance because the GLO surveyor was instructed, on a particular date (in this case, September
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7, 1900), to place the meanderline where the vegetation line actually existed. Id. at p. 200. For
purposes of proceedings before the District Court, IDL introduced no lake elevation readings prior
to 1930. Id. However, we do know that the GLO surveyor placed the meanderline, based upon the
vegetation line as it existed on September 7, 1900, waterward of2437.64 feet. Id.
If the OHWM of Priest Lake at statehood was two vertical feet lower than the level urged by

IDL, consistent with the pre-1950 hydrograph evidence and the inferences gleaned from historical
surveys, then the Hudson encroachments would be located above the OHWM. Specifically, an
OHWM of 2435.64 feet (two feet lower than the level urged by IDL) would have the effect of
extending the Hudson property nineteen (19) feet waterward of the boundary as it exists at lake level
2437.64 feet. Id. at p. 202. If the Hudson property is extended nineteen (19) feet waterward of
elevation 2437.64 feet, the Hudson encroachment is on Hudson's property, and not the property of
the State. Id.
Hudson and his wife acquired their property in 1997. R., p. 167. The same year, the
Hudsons made application to IDL for the placement of a dock adjacent to their property. Id. A
permit was issued on July 1, 1997, and the Hudsons subsequently constructed the dock as authorized.

Shortly thereafter, it became evident to the Hudsons that increased boat traffic on Priest Lake,
coupled with an increase in the typical size of those boats, together with the resulting boat wake
activity, was damaging and degrading the shoreline of their property. Id. The destabilization caused

1 /\
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by these factors was exacerbated during periods of intermittent storms. Id. Hudson believed that
the OHWM of Priest Lake was lower than the level urged by IDL. Id. Noting the continued
destabilization of his property, and believing that the boundary of his property extended waterward
some distance below 2437.64 feet, Hudson sought to preserve and to protect his shoreline. Id. at p.
168. On a periodic and intermittent basis, from late 1997 through approximately early 2014, Hudson
would personally perform work on his property in an effort the stabilize the shoreline. Id. Hudson
performed this work, by hand, and placed largely naturally-occurring materials from land contiguous
to the beach on his exposed shoreline area. Id. Hudson placed these materials at or about the area
he believed to be the boundary of his property, during periods when his property was exposed and
free from the presence of water. Id. In other words, all of that work was personally performed by
Hudson when his property was "dry" and free from any water. Id.
Hudson did not seek a permit for the work he accomplished by hand as he believed, and
continues to believe, that he was working on his own property, and placing no encroachments on the
property of the State. Id. Hudson's work proceeded over several years, on an intermittent basis,
when he had the time and circumstances would warrant. Id.
Hudson never received any complaint or inquiry from or on behalf of the State until July 17,
2014. R., p. 169. Upon receipt of the State's demand, that he remove the encroachments, Hudson
engaged professionals to assist in the preparation of a responsive plan. Id. IDL rejected the
recommendation. The State then brought this proceeding.
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II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
Whether the District Court erred in granting IDL's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on IDL's First Claim for Relief (which alleged that Hudson had violated
the terms of the Lake Protection Act by placing fill waterward of the Ordinary High
Water Mark of Priest Lake)?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The District Court's Partial Judgment was entered upon IDL 's successful Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. The governing standard of review in this regard is as follows:
On appeal from an order granting a party's motion for summary judgment, this Court
employs the same standard of review that the trial court uses in ruling on a motion.
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixon Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123,
206 P.3d 481,487 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,
affidavits, and discovery documents before the Court indicate that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Banner Life Ins. Co.,, 147 Idaho at 123,206 P.3d at
487. The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.
Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,222,220 P.3d 575 (2009).

IV.

ARGUMENT.
A.

The Statutory Framework Underlying IDL's First Claim for Relief.

IDL' s first claim for relief, upon which partial summary judgment was granted, was asserted
under the Lake Protection Act, LC. §58-1301, et seq. ("LPA''). The Hudson encroachment is "an
encroachment not in aid of navigation," as defined by ID APA 20.03.17.010(10), and the District
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Court so held. R., p. 344. "Encroachments not in aid of navigation" is a term that may be used
interchangeably with "non-navigational encroachments." See LC. §58-1302(i).
Non-navigational encroachments on the beds of navigable lakes of the State may only be
authorized under a permit issued in conformity with LPA. See I.C. §58-1301. The term "beds of
navigable lakes," for purposes of administering the LPA, is defined as follows:
(B)

"Beds of navigable lakes" means the lands lying under or
below the "natural or ordinary high water mark" of a
navigable lake and, for purposes of this Act only, the lands
lying between the natural or ordinary high water mark and the
artificial high water mark, if there be one.

See LC. §58-1302(b).
For purposes of summary judgment, IDL sought removal of the Hudson encroachments
placed waterward of elevation 2437.64 feet. The District Court held that it did not matter whether
or not elevation 2437.64 feet was the "natural or ordinary high water mark" (OHWM) or the
"artificial high water mark" (AHWM) of Priest Lake, since IDL had jurisdictional authority to
regulate encroachments below either mark. R., pp. 345-46. Based on this finding, the District Court
ordered the removal of all Hudson encroachments lying below elevation 2437.64 feet (which by
necessity included the Hudson encroachments lying between 2435.64 and 2437.64 feet). The
District Court's finding and the resulting partial summary judgment are in error because they were
improperly entered given the presence of genuine issues of material fact.
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B.

IDL Specifically Denied, Under Oath and Through Counsel, that Priest
Lake had an Artificial High Water Mark.

The District Court determined that the Hudson encroachment, lying below 2437.64 feet,
should be removed regardless of whether or not elevation 243 7 .64 feet was the OHVv1'v1 or AHWM
of Priest Lake. The District Court's finding was improperly entered in the context of a motion for
partial summary judgment. IDL's own representations to the District Court wholly undermine the
propriety of the partial summary judgment.
In its "Verified Complaint," IDL averred, under oath and as a statement of fact, that Hudson
had placed an encroachment "below the ordinary high water mark adjacentto Hudson's property .... "
R., p. 6. Hudson answered IDL' s Verified Complaint, specifically denying IDL' s allegation that he
had placed an encroachment below the OHWM of Priest Lake. Id. at p. 19. Hudson counterclaimed,
by way of claims for declaratory relief and quiet title, alleging that his encroachments were upland
of the OHWM of Priest Lake. R., p. 22 (i!IO). In reply to Hudson's counterclaims, IDL denied
Hudson's allegation and affirmatively alleged that the OHWM of Priest Lake was 2437.64 feet. Id.
at p. 28.
In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, IDL, through counsel, specifically represented
to the Court that IDL "denies that there is an artificial high water mark of Priest Lake .... " R., p. 70.
This representation was restated in the Memorandum IDL filed in support of its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment: "As set forth in the State's pleadings, the State specifically denies that there
is an artificial high water mark of Priest Lake." Id. at p. 73. For purposes of summary judgment,
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this Court should take note that IDL's complaint was verified. By stating that there is no AHWM
on Priest Lake, IDL was stating the same as a sworn representation of fact.

Further, the

representations and positions taken by a party's counsel bind the client. Moreover, IDL asserted
other sworn testimony that there was no AHWM on Priest Lake. In support of its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, IDL filed the Affidavit of Mick Schanilec, Area Manager for the Priest Lake
Supervisory Area for IDL. Schanilec stated, under oath, that "the State considers the natural or
ordinary high water mark" of Priest Lake to be elevation 2437.64 feet. R., p. 84.
Based on the foregoing, in the context of a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, it was
established, by IDL' s own evidence, that there was no AHWM on Priest Lake. IDL sought relief,
in the form of an injunction ordering the removal of the subject encroachment, based solely upon the
claim that the Hudson encroachment was located below the OHWM and not below an AHWM (since
IDL affirmatively cited that an AHWM even existed). In order to prevail at summary judgment, IDL
was required to show that there were no genuine issues of material fact that the OHWM of Priest
Lake at statehood was located at 2437.64 feet.

C.

Location of a Given OHWM Presents an Issue of Fact.

The precise location of an OHWM is a question of fact. See,~' U.S. v. Marion L. Kincaid
Trust, 463 F. Supp.2d 680 (Ed. Mich. 2006). In both In Re: Sanders Beach, at 143 Idaho 443, and
Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208, this Court set forth detailed discussions of evidence to be
considered in the context of determining the location of a given OHWM on an inland navigable lake

1 I::
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in the State ofldaho. While not directly stating that the location of an OHWM in Idaho is a question
of fact, such conclusion can reasonably be drawn from this Court's analyses in the two cited cases.

D.

The Materials Properly Before the District Court on Summary
Judgment.

IDL supported its motion with its Verified Complaint (R., pp. 7-14), coupled with the
Affidavits of Mick Schanilec (R., pp. 82-111) and Matthew Anders (R., pp. 112-4 7). The foregoing
submissions were filed in a timely manner compliant with the requirements of IRCP 56(b )(2).
Hudson filed three declarations in opposition to IDL' s motion: the Declaration of Philip Hudson (R.,
pp. 166-94); the Declaration of Ernest M. Warner, PLS (R., pp. 195-215); and the Declaration of
Drew C. Dittman, P.E. (R., pp. 216-22).
On June 15, 2016, seven days before the hearing it had noticed on its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, IDL filed a Second Affidavit of Mick Schanilec. R., pp. 231-50. Rule 56(b)(2)
requires that affidavits in support of a motion for summary judgment be filed at least twenty-eight
(28) days before the date of the hearing. Rule 56(b)(2) only authorizes the moving party to file a
"reply brief," to the exclusion of further affidavits, seven (7) days before the date of the hearing. IDL
did not accompany the second Schanilec affidavit with a motion to alter the timelines under Rule
56(b)(3).
On June 17, 2016, Hudson moved to strike the second Schanilec affidavit. R., pp. 251-52.
The District Court did not rule upon Hudson's motion to strike the second Schanilec affidavit. R.,
p. 346.
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For purposes of appellate review, this Court is to "employ the same standard of review that
the trial court used in ruling on the motion." Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixon
Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho at 123. Accordingly, this Court should, by necessity, address Hudson's
motion to strike the second Schanilec affidavit.
As noted, Rule 56(c) does not contemplate the filing of "reply affidavits" or any other
affidavit not filed and served twenty-eight (28) days before the time fixed for the hearing. The
language contained in Rule 56(c) is mandatory. See, M,_, Sun Valley v. Rosholt, Robertson &
Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5, 981 P.2d 236 (1999).
Federal courts have reached the same conclusion under federal procedures applicable to
motions for summary judgment. For example, in Tishcon Corp. v. Soundview Communications,
Inc., 2005 W.L. 6038743 (N.D. Ga. 2005), the Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment and
submitted supporting declarations. After the Defendant had responded, the Plaintiff submitted
additional declarations with its reply memorandum. The Defendant then moved to strike the
Plaintiffs reply declarations, arguing that they were untimely because they did not accompany the
motion when filed. The Defendant contended that because the reply declarations were submitted
after the Defendant had responded to the Plaintiffs motion, that the Defendant would be unfairly
prejudiced by the Court's consideration of those declarations.
The Court agreed with the Defendant, noting that the rule was intended "to ensure that the
party opposing a motion for summary judgment be given sufficient time to respond to the affidavits
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filed by the moving party, thereby avoiding any undue prejudice." Tishcon Corp., 2005 W.L.
6038743 at p. 8.
Justice is not served by allowing a moving party to unfairly surprise and prejudice the
non-movant by producing evidence of new, substm1tive facts at the last minute when
there is no opportunity [under the rules] for the non-movant to respond ....

In the case at bar, IDL failed to offer any justification for the untimeliness of the second
Schanilec affidavit. Moreover, IDL failed to file a motion under Rule 56(b)(3) to alter the mandatory
timelines that apply to motions for partial summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the second
Schanilec affidavit should not be considered for purposes of resolving this appeal.

E.

Material Issues of Fact Precluded an Entry of Partial Summary
Judgment.

IDL specifically denied, under oath, that Priest Lake had an AHWM. IDL further stated,
under oath and through representations of counsel, that the OHWM of Priest Lake was located at
elevation 2437.64 feet. Based upon these sworn statements, IDL moved for entry of a partial
summary judgment finding that Hudson had violated the LP A by placing an unpermitted
encroachment waterward of Priest Lake's OHWM.
The location of the OHWM itself, as of July 3, 1890, presents an issue of fact. See,~' In
Re: Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006). See also Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208,
970 P .2d 1 (1998). Through his opposing submissions, Hudson raised material issues of fact as to
the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake and as to whether or not the Hudson encroachment was
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located upland of said OHWM.
Prior to 1950, and based upon all available historic hydrographs presented to the Court on
summary judgment, the level of Priest Lake naturally receded during the summer growing season
to an elevation at least two vertical feet below 2437.64 feet. R., pp. 198 and 205. Resolving all
inferences in favor of Hudson, as the non-moving party, and recognizing that vegetation grows in
Idaho in the month of August, one can reasonably conclude, for purposes of summary judgment, that
vegetation grew along the shores of Priest Lake, to an elevation of2435.64 feet, at Statehood. This
inference is consistent with the expert opinion offered by Warner as to the location of historic
meanderlines.
While meanderlines are not in and of themselves boundary lines, the location of the same can
have independent historical significance based upon the instructions given to the GLO surveyor for
purposes oflocating the line. R., pp. 198-99. Hudson's property was initially surveyed by the GLO
on September 7, 1900, approximately ten years after statehood. The contract under which Robert
Bonser surveyed the Hudson property for the GLO instructed Bonser to locate the meanderline in
a manner consistent with the then-existing Ordinary Mean High Water Mark which, in Idaho,
coincides with the vegetation line. R., pp. 199-200. Accordingly, while the physical location of the
meanderline is not in and of itself a boundary, the location of a given meanderline on an inland
navigable lake has independent historical significance because the GLO surveyor was instructed, on
a particular date (in this case, September 7, 1900), to place the meanderline where the vegetation line
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existed. Id.
For purposes of this proceeding, although there may be no reliable lake elevation readings
prior to 1930, we do know where the GLO surveyor placed the meanderline, based upon the presence
of then-existing vegetation, on September, 1900. Id. The location of the meanderline associated
with the Hudson property suggests that the vegetation line, as of September 7, 1900, was located
approximately nineteen (19) feet waterward of elevation 2437.64 feet. Id. at pp. 201-02.
Physical measurements of the Hudson encroachment show that most, if not all of the
encroachments, are located within this nineteen (19) feet expanse between elevations 2435.64 and
2437.64. R., pp. 202 and 217.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of a material fact
based upon the admissible record evidence. Moss v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103
Idaho 298, 647 P.2d 754 (1982). In determining whether or not a genuine issue of material fact
exists, the Court is to construe the record evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 P.2d 1150 (1976). Hudson raised
material issues of fact as to both the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake at Statehood and whether
or not his encroachment was located upland of said OHWM (i.e., on his own property).

F.

The District Court Erred, as a Matter of Fact and of Law, by
Determining that Priest Lake had an AHWM of 2437.64 Feet.

The District Court improperly granted IDL's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
reasoning that it did not need to determine the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake since IDL had
20

jurisdiction to regulate encroachments up to and including the AHWM. R., p. 346. The District
Court's decision was in error, both as a matter of fact and as a matter oflaw.
From a factual perspective, IDL, as the moving party, averred under oath that the OHWM
of Priest Lake was located at 2437.64 feet. R., p. 84 (,!5). IDL specifically denied, as a matter of
fact, that there was an AHWM on Priest Lake. R., p. 73 ("As set forth in the State's pleadings, the
State specifically denies that there is an Artificial High Water Mark of Priest Lake."). IDL's relief
was sought based upon a claim that Hudson's encroachment was "constructed at and below the
Ordinary High Water Mark of Priest Lake." R., p. 11.
The District Court plainly erred by entering a decision that determined that Priest Lake had
an AHWM and that the AHWM was located at elevation 2437.64 feet. Essentially, the District
Court held that it made no difference as to whether or not the Hudson encroachment was located
waterward of the OHWM or the AHWM since IDL had jurisdiction up to and including both
elevations. However, based upon its pleadings, and the sworn submissions submitted in support of
the motion, IDL specifically denied that Priest Lake had an AHWM and affirmatively sought to
prove that the OHWM of Priest Lake was at elevation 2437.64 feet. Hence, the District Court
improperly resolved an issue of fact which was, by necessity, rendered incapable of resolution based
upon the positions and facts advanced by IDL.
Regarding the matter of law, the District Court erred by holding that IDL had jurisdiction
under the LPA over the Hudson encroachments based upon an AHWM which the State said did not

21

exist. Section 58-1302(b) acknowledges IDLjurisdiction over "the lands lying between the natural
or ordinary high water mark and the artificial high water mark, if there be one." However, since IDL
denies that there is an artificial high water mark on Priest Lake, and affirmatively alleges (under
oath) that the OHWM is 243 7.64, IDL was required to prove the absence of any material issue of fact
as to the location of said OHWM. Given the procedural posture of this case, and given the facts
sworn to by IDL, any analysis or conclusion based upon a hypothetical AHWM was inappropriate.
At the end of the day, IDL claimed as follows. That Priest Lake had no AHWM; that the
OHWM of Priest Lake was located at elevation 243 7 .64 feet; and that the Hudson encroachment was
located waterward of 24 3 7. 64 feet. Hudson opposed the motion by raising genuine issues of material
fact as to the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake as represented by IDL. In making its decision,
the District Court, by its own admission, ignored Hudson's evidence as to the location of the OHWM
(including the Declaration of Ernest M. Warner, PLS). R., p. 346. In so doing, the District Court
committed reversible error.

In essence, the District Court granted relief to IDL even though IDL failed to prove the
existence of a material element necessary to its claim. How can IDL be granted relief based upon
the location of an AHWM when IDL specifically denies that there even is an AHWM? By way of
analogy, this is no different than a litigant bringing a cause of action for adverse possession and
being granted summary judgment even though the litigant denies he openly and notoriously used the
property in issue (a material element of an adverse possession claim). By way of further analogy,
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it is no different than a litigant bringing a claim for breach of contract and being granted summary
judgment even though the litigant denies that there was a contract (a material element of the claim).
G.

IDL is Estopped, Both at the District Court and Appellate Levels, From
Claiming That There is an AH\VM on Priest Lake.

Having denied under oath that there is an AHWM on Priest Lake, IDL is now estopped to
claim otherwise, whether before the District Court or this Court. Moreover, IDL cannot obtain relief
by contradicting its own sworn testimony.
In Radobenko v. Automated Equipment Corp., 520 F.2d 540 (91h Circuit 1975), the Court,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), held that a party could not contradict its sworn
statements for purposes of obtaining relief on summary judgment. This Court has similarly held as
much in other contexts. See,~' Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,291 P.3d 1000 (2012);
Frasier v. J.R.Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 29 P.3d 936 (2001).
V.

CONCLUSION.
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, Appellant Philip Hudson respectfully

requests that this Court reverse the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on partial
summary judgment, vacate the District Court's Judgment and Amended Judgment, dissolve the
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District Court's mandatory and permanent injunction, remand the matter for further proceedings with
this Court's opinion, and award Hudson his costs on appeal.

Ji_..
Dated this:l;l__ day of January, 2017.
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